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A fundamental question in development economics is the extent to which economic success 
is linked to basic features of human preferences. If people are extremely averse to financial risk, 
they may be reluctant to create businesses that may have inherently risky cash flows. If people 
are impatient, they may be reluctant to invest and educate their children. Taken together, risk 
aversion and impatience may explain, in part, why some people remain poor.
We conducted experiments in Vietnamese villages to directly measure risk and time prefer-
ences of individuals, and investigated how these preferences correlate with economic circum-
stances. Vietnam has several advantages as a field site:
 (i) Access to a 2002 living standard survey enabled us to link detailed survey responses 
from individuals directly to experimental responses by the same individuals.
 (ii) Most Vietnamese villagers are poor but literate. As a result, it is easy to motivate them 
with modest financial stakes and to ensure they comprehend instructions.
 (iii) The rise of household businesses in the market economy has created substantial variation 
in income. This income variation can be correlated with preference measures.
In any cross-sectional study like this, it is difficult to infer the direction of causality from 
correlation: do preferences cause economic circumstances (e.g., through business formation), 
or do circumstances create preferences as described by Samuel Bowles (1998)? An ideal study 
would use randomized assignment of individuals to economic circumstances. As an alternative, 
we employ an instrumental variable approach, using rainfall and household head’s ability to 
work at the time of survey, which are unlikely to be correlated with preferences, as instrumental 
variables for income.
Beside contributing new data, our paper makes a methodological contribution to experimen-
tal development economics. Most previous experiments conducted in the field tested models of 
risk and time preferences that can be characterized by one parameter. See Juan-Camilo Cardenas 
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and Jeffrey Carpenter (2008) for a review. These models often fit experimental data in Western 
educated populations (Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein, and Ted O’Donoghue 2002; Chris 
Starmer 2000) and field data (Camerer 2000) less well than models with multiple components of 
risk and time preferences. For example, in expected utility (EU) theory, risk preferences are charac-
terized solely by the concavity of a utility function for money. But if risky choices express prospect 
theory preferences (Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 1979), then utility concavity is not the 
only parameter influencing risk preferences; nonlinear weighting of probabilities, and aversion to 
loss compared to gain, also influence risk preferences. Our instruments are designed to measure 
these three parameters of prospect theory, rather than just one in EU.
Similarly, we measure three parameters in a general time discounting model (Jess Benhabib, 
Alberto Bisin, and Andrew Schotter 2007), rather than measuring a single exponential discount 
rate as in most other studies. If the exponential model is an adequate approximation, then our 
richer instruments will deliver parameter values of the extra variables that affirm the virtue of 
the simpler exponential.
Before proceeding to design details and results, it is useful to discuss how our approach com-
pares to other field experiments. Field experiments in development are powerful tools for policy 
evaluation because they can randomize treatments in naturally occurring decision making to 
see how well a specific policy works in a specific setting with a proper control group (see Esther 
Duflo 2005 for a review). For example, Nava Ashraf, Dean Karlan, and Wesley Yin (2006) found 
that women who displayed lower discount rates in a hypothetical-question survey were more 
likely to open a commitment savings account offered by a bank in the Philippines.
Our approach is different. Our study is designed to collect preference measures experimentally 
and correlate those measures with demographic and economic variables (income, in particular) 
from the previous household survey. The goal is to contribute basic tools for field experimenta-
tion and to generate tentative observations about the correlation between preferences and eco-
nomic circumstances. No single result will be as conclusive as more targeted studies that explore 
the effect of a specific policy. Nevertheless, the policy-specific approach and our broad approach 
are complementary. Targeted studies like that of Ashraf et al. tell broader studies, like ours, 
what to look for. And broader studies give a rich set of tentative results for more targeted studies 
to explore more carefully. Accumulation of empirical regularity will come most quickly from 
conducting  both types of studies.
I.  Selection of Research Sites and Research Methods
In July–August 2005, risk and time discounting experiments were conducted with members of 
households who were previously interviewed during a 2002 living standard measurement survey.1 
In the 2002 survey, 25 households were interviewed in each of 142 rural villages in the Mekong 
Delta (in the south) and 137 rural villages in the Red River Delta (in the north).2 From these, we 
chose nine villages, five villages in the south and four villages in the north, with substantial dif-
ferences in mean village income and market access. Some descriptive statistics about the nine 
experimental village sites are given in Table 1. The southern villages are indexed by S1–S5 (where 
1 A discrete trust game was conducted before the risk and time discounting experiments. Trust outcomes were not 
revealed until the end of the session and are reported elsewhere.
2 The 2002 living standard survey covers total 354,360 households in Vietnam. According to the local government 
officials in our research sites, lists of all households in selected villages were submitted to district offices, and house-
holds were randomly selected from the lists for the survey. 
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S1 indexes the highest village wealth and S5 indexes the lowest), and northern villages are indexed 
by N1–N4.3
A week before the experiments, research coordinators contacted local government officials 
in each research site and asked them to invite one person from each of the 25 previously sur-
veyed households to the experiments. Experiments started at approximately 9 am in the morn-
ing, and lasted about four hours. Subjects were given instructions and separate record sheets for 
each game. Illiterate subjects (8 percent) were given verbal instruction by research assistants. 
Subjects who had difficulty completing record sheets by themselves were also helped by research 
assistants who carefully avoided giving specific instructions about how to answer. The average 
experimental earning for three games was 174,141 dong (about 11 dollars)4, roughly 6 to 9 days’ 
wages for casual unskilled labor.
II.  Risk
A. Previous findings
Ravi Kanbur and Lyn Squire (2001) describe the risk attitude of the poor as “a feeling of vul-
nerability.” Market fluctuations and natural disasters could put these villagers in a state of having 
little or losing what little they have. Empirical evidence suggests wealthier households invest 
in more risky productive activities and earn higher returns (Mark R. Rosenzweig and Hans P. 
Binswanger 1993). These premises are consistent with decreasing absolute risk aversion in EU 
theory; wealthier people are willing to take more risk than poorer people.
However, previous experimental studies conducted in developing countries give mixed results 
on wealth and risk preferences. Binswanger (1980, 1981) and Paul Mosley and Arjan Verschoor 
(2005) find no significant association between risk aversion and wealth. Uffe Nielsen (2001) finds 
positive relations between wealth and risk aversion, while Matte Wik et. al. (2004) and Mahmud 
Yesuf (2004) find negative correlations. However, they used EU and mix gain-only and gain-loss 
3 Villages S1 and S3 are in Can Tho City, Village S2 is in Ca Mau Province, Villages S4 and S5 are in Tra Vinh 
Province, Villages N1 and N2 are in Vinh Phuc Province, and Villages N3 and N4 are in Thai Binh Province.
4 The exchange rate between the Vietnamese dong and US dollar does not fluctuate very much. On July 23, 2005, the 
exchange rate was 15,880 dong for one dollar, while it was 15,947 dong for one dollar on July 23, 2002. 
Table 1—Descriptive Statistics
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 N1 N2 N3 N4
Total number of subjects 22 16 18 21 21 17 22 24 20
 Ethnic Chinese subjects 9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean household income in 2002 (1 million dong)
36.6 35.8 20.3 18.5 15.0 28.0 17.5 9.1 7.2
Age (mean) 47.7 44.6 48.8 42.8 47.9 55.1 42.5 49.9 48.6
Gender (1 = male) (mean) 0.59 0.88 0.83 0.71 0.81 0.47 0.36 0.50 0.50
Education (years) (mean) 7.2 7.1 8.4 6.0 5.0 7.5 8.0 4.8 7.6
Literacy rate (mean) 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.89 0.95 0.83 0.90
Distance to nearest market 0.0 5.0 0.0 4.2 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.0 0.3
Rainfall (mm) 1,442 2,328 1,442 1,202 1,202 1,399 1,399 1,442 1,442
Number of household heads unable to work at the time of survey
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 2
Daily wage for male labor for harvesting (1,000 dong)
— — 30 30 30 18 18 20 20
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gambles in their analysis, making it difficult to tell whether risk aversion comes solely from the 
concavity of utility function.
B. Measurement of Prospect Theory Parameters
We consider prospect theory as an alternative theoretical framework to EU, and conduct 
experiments with lotteries involving both gains and losses. We use cumulative prospect the-
ory and the one-parameter form of Drazen Prelec’s (1998) axiomatically derived weighting 
function. The values of prospects are v(y) + π(p)(v (x) −v (y)) (for xy > 0 and | x | > | y |) or 
v (y) + π(p)v (x) + π(q)v (y), where p and q are the probabilities of outcomes x and y. We assume 
a piecewise power function for value, v (x) = x σ for gains x > 0, and v (x) = −λ(−x)σ for losses x 
< 0. The probability weighting function is π(p) = 1/exp [ ln (1/p)]α.
Parameters σ and λ represent concavity of the value function, and the degree of loss aversion. 
The probability weighting function is linear if α = 1, as it is in EU. If α < 1, the weighting func-
tion is inverted S-shaped, i.e., individuals overweight small probabilities and underweight large 
probabilities, as shown by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). If α > 1, then the weighting function 
is S-shaped, i.e., individuals underweight small probabilities and overweight large probabilities. 
The above model reduces to EU (with a reflected utility function at zero) if α = 1 and λ = 1.
To elicit the three prospect theory parameters, we designed three series of paired lotteries 
as shown in Table 2. Each row is a choice between two binary lotteries, A or B. We enforced 
monotonic switching by asking subjects at which question they would “switch” from Option A to 
Option B in each series. They can switch to Option B starting with the first question, and they do 
not have to switch to Option B at all.5 After they complete three series of questions with the total 
of 35 choices, we draw a numbered ball from a bingo cage with 35 numbered balls to determine 
which row of choice will be played for real money. We then put back ten numbered balls in the 
bingo cage and played the selected lottery.
The difference in expected value between the lotteries (A relative to B) is shown in the right 
column. As one moves down the rows, the higher payoff in Option B increases and everything 
else is fixed. The choices are carefully designed so any combination of choices in the three 
series determines a particular interval of prospect theory parameter values. Table 3 illustrates the 
combinations of approximate values of σ, α, and λ for each switching point. “Never” indicates 
the cases in which a subject does not switch to Option B (i.e., always chooses A). The switching 
points in Series 1 and 2 jointly determine σ and α. For example, suppose a subject switched from 
Option A to B at the seventh question in Series 1. The combinations of (σ, α) that can rationalize 
this switch are (0.4, 0.4), (0.5, 0.5), (0.6, 0.6), (0.7, 0.7), (0.8, 0.8), (0.9, 0.9), or (1, 1). Now suppose 
the same subjects also switched from Option A to B at the seventh question in Series 2. Then the 
combinations of (σ, α) that rationalize that switch are (0.8, 0.6), (0.7, 0.7), (0.6, 0.8), (0.5, 0.9), or 
(0.4, 1). By intersecting these parameter ranges from Series 1 and 2, we obtain the approximate 
values of (σ, α) = (0.7, 0.7). Predictions of (σ, α) for all possible combinations of choices are given 
in Table A1 in the Web Appendix (available at http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/
aer.100.1.557).
The loss aversion parameter λ is determined by the switching point in Series 3. Notice that λ 
cannot be uniquely inferred from switching in Series 3. Questions in Series 3 were constructed 
to make sure that λ takes similar values across different levels of σ. Table 3 shows the range of λ 
for each switching point for three values σ = 0.2, 0.6, and 1.
5 The instructions gave three examples. In one example a subject switches at the sixth question, in one example the 
subject chooses Option A for all questions, and in one example the subject chooses Option B for all questions. The three 
examples were given to help ensure that subjects do not feel that they are forced to switch.
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C. Empirical Results
Figure 1 shows the distributions of choices made by subjects in Series 1 and 2. The numbers in 
the axes correspond to the switching points in Series 1 and 2.6 The height of a cone represents the 
number of subjects who switched at that particular combination of switching points in Series 1 
and 2. Black cones represent the choices that are consistent with EU. There are not many subjects 
whose choices are consistent with EU. The mean estimated values of (σ, α) are (0.59, 0.74) and 
(0.63, 0.74) in the south and north, respectively. Elaine Liu (2008) replicated this risk experiment 
6 Switching point 15 implies the subject never switched in that series.
Table 2—Three Series of Pairwise Lottery Choices (in 1,000 dong)
Option A Option B Expected payoff difference (A−B)
series 1
Balls 1–3 Balls 4–10 Ball 1 Balls 2–10
40 10 68 5 7.7
40 10 75 5 7.0
40 10 83 5 6.0
40 10 93 5 5.2
40 10 106 5 3.9
40 10 125 5 2.0
40 10 150 5 −0.5
40 10 185 5 −4.0
40 10 220 5 −7.5
40 10 300 5 −15.5
40 10 400 5 −25.5
40 10 600 5 −45.5
40 10 1,000 5 −85.5
40 10 1,700 5 −155.5
series 2
Balls 1–9 Ball 10 Balls 1–7 Balls 8–10
40 30 54 5 −0.3
40 30 56 5 −1.7
40 30 58 5 −3.1
40 30 60 5 −4.5
40 30 62 5 −5.9
40 30 65 5 −8.0
40 30 68 5 −10.1
40 30 72 5 −12.9
40 30 77 5 −16.4
40 30 83 5 −20.6
40 30 90 5 −25.5
40 30 100 5 −32.5
40 30 110 5 −39.5
40 30 130 5 −53.5
series 3
Balls 1–5 Balls 6–10 Balls 1–5 Balls 6–10
25 −4 30 −21 6.0
4 −4 30 −21 −4.5
1 −4 30 −21 −6.0
1 −4 30 −16 −8.5
1 −8 30 −16 −10.5
1 −8 30 −14 −11.5
1 −8 30 −11 −13.0
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with Chinese farmers and estimated average values (0.48, 0.69), which are reasonably close. The 
average derived value of α is significantly different from one at the 1 percent significance level 
by t-test, rejecting EU in favor of inverted-S shaped probability weighting (see Ming Hsu et al. 
(2009) for a review and neural measures). We regressed the curvature of the utility function 
(σ) using OLS regressions, and loss aversion (λ) by interval regressions using maximum likeli-
hood techniques against individual-specific variables.7 We first ran regressions using household 
income as an independent variable.
The regression results are shown in columns 1 and 3 of Table 4. Looking first at σ (curvature 
of the utility function), the strongest effects suggest subjects who are more educated and older are 
more risk averse. The estimation result for loss aversion (λ) shows ethnic Chinese are less loss 
averse and people living in the south are more loss averse. Household income is not significantly 
correlated with either σ or λ.
Having learned that household income does not correlate with either risk aversion (in terms 
of concavity of utility function) or loss aversion, we decomposed household income into two 
variables, mean village income and relative income within the village (subtracting the mean and 
dividing by the within-village standard deviation).
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 4 contain the regression results of the estimations. Neither relative 
income nor mean income of the village correlates with concavity of utility function. However, 
mean village income is strongly correlated with loss aversion. Nevertheless, income variables 
may be endogenous, and it is difficult to know whether they explain risk preferences, or vice 
versa. We used rainfall and household head’s ability to work at the time of survey as exogenous 
7 The average estimated value of λ is 2.63, close to the 2.25 estimated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), and is 
significantly different from one by t-test (p < 0.001). Liu’s (2008) estimate is 3.47. For a further survey and evidence 
that loss aversion can be emotionally regulated, see Peter Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009).
 Table 3—Switching Point (Question at which Preference Switches from Option A to Option B) and 
Approximations of σ, α and λ 
series 1 (questions 1–14) series 2 (questions 15–28)
σ  α 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 σ  α 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.2 9 10 11 12 13 14 never 0.2 never 14 13 12 11 10 9
0.3 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 0.3 14 13 12 11 10 9 8
0.4 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 0.4 13 12 11 10 9 8 7
0.5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 0.5 12 11 10 9 8 7 6
0.6 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 0.6 11 10 9 8 7 6 5
0.7 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0.7 10 9 8 7 6 5 4
0.8 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0.8 9 8 7 6 5 4 3
0.9 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 0.9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
1.0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1.0 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
series 3 (questions 29–35)
Switching question σ = 0.2 σ = 0.6 σ = 1
1 λ > 0.14 λ > 0.20 λ > 0.29
2 0.14 < λ < 1.26 0.20 < λ < 1.38 0.29 < λ < 1.53
3 1.26 < λ < 1.88 1.38 < λ < 1.71 1.53 < λ < 1.71
4 1.88 < λ < 2.31 1.71 < λ < 2.25 1.71 < λ < 2.42
5 2.31 < λ < 4.32 2.25 < λ < 3.73 2.42 < λ < 3.63
6 4.32 < λ < 5.43 3.73 < λ < 4.82 3.63 < λ < 4.83
7 5.43 < λ < 9.78 4.82 < λ < 9.13 4.83 < λ < 9.67
Note: Bold indicates choices compatible with EU (α = 1) and risk aversion.
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instruments for income variables,8 and conducted the Hausman and Davidson-MacKinnon tests 
to investigate whether OLS is an inconsistent estimator for curvature of the utility function (σ) 
and loss aversion (λ). The results of both tests suggest OLS is an inconsistent estimator for σ 
(see Table 4). Therefore, we conducted instrumental variable two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) 
regressions for the curvature of the utility function (σ). The IV regression results are shown 
in Table 5. The variable “head can’t work ” is a dummy variable, taking the value one if the 
household head was not able to work at the time of the survey. The effect of mean income is now 
significant at the 10 percent level, i.e., individuals living in wealthier villages are less loss averse 
and also less risk averse. There are no significant effects of gender, which is interesting because 
many studies find that men are less averse to financial risk than women (e.g., Catherine C. Eckel 
and Philip Grossman 2008). Our findings suggest that these previous effects of gender may be 
8 We tested several instrumental variables, e.g., funeral costs, natural disaster relief, crop failure due to natural 
disaster and pests, and selected rainfall and household head’s ability to work as instruments, since these variables yield 
the highest f-statistic in the regression.
1
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Figure 1. Distribution of Switching Points in Series 1 and 2
Notes: Experimental data. Black denotes switching point pairs consistent with EU.
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due to confounds with variables that often correlate with gender, such as income and education, 
which can be controlled for using our household survey.
III.  Time Discounting
A. Previous findings
Time discounting is another fundamental preference which may affect wealth accumulation. 
Most studies linking discount rates to wealth in both developed and developing societies use 
the exponential discounting model and show richer people are more patient (lower r).9 However, 
the exponential discounting model is often rejected by experimental and field data (Frederick, 
9 Jerry Hausman (1979), Emily C. Lawrance (1991), and Glenn W. Harrison, Marten I. Lau and Melonie B. Williams 
(2002) report this relation in the United States and Denmark. John L. Pender (1996), Nielsen (2001), and Yesuf (2004) 
report it in India, Madagascar, and Ethiopia, respectively. Kris N. Kirby et al. (2002), and C. Leigh Anderson et al. 
(2004) did not find a wealth-patience relation in Bolivia and Vietnam, but their villages did not have as much income 
variation as we were able to design by handpicking villages. 
Table 4—Correlations with Dimensions of Risk Aversion (OLS)
Dependent variable
σ (Value function curvature)  λ (Loss aversion)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Chinese 0.039 0.027 −3.273* −2.341
(0.115) (0.121) (1.711) (1.769)
Age −0.005** −0.005** 0.042 0.049
(0.002) (0.002) (0.030) (0.030)
Gender −0.035 −0.028 −0.524 −0.557
(0.056) (0.056) (0.791) (0.781)
Education −0.019** −0.020*** 0.098 0.141
(0.007) (0.008) (0.105) (0.106)
Income −0.001 −0.028
(0.001) (0.017)
Relative income −0.011 −0.600
(0.026) (0.371)
Mean income 0.000 −0.086**
(0.003) (0.043)
Distance to market −0.008 −0.008 −0.178 −0.151
(0.014) (0.015) (0.206) (0.205)
South −0.033 −0.052 1.479* 1.994**
(0.057) (0.064) (0.810) (0.888)
Constant 1.054*** 1.038*** 0.514 0.722
(0.141) (0.144) (1.997) (2.000)
Observations 181 181 181 181
R2 0.07 0.06
Log likelihood −436 −434
Hausman test χ2 = 5.23
( p = 0.022)
χ2 = 5.52
( p = 0.063)
χ2 = 0.27
( p = 0.999)
χ2 = 3.33
( p = 0.853)
Davidson-MacKinnon test f-statistic
 = 5.36
( p = 0.021)
f-statistic
 = 2.82
( p = 0.063)
χ2 = 0.06
( p = 0.814)
χ2 = 0.87
( p = 0.814)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
  * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2002). For example, measured discount rates tend to decline over 
time10 (George Ainslie 1992) and exhibit a “present bias” or preference for immediate reward.11 
David Laibson (1997) proposed “quasi-hyperbolic” discounting model.12
B. Measurement of Time discounting Parameters
We use a general model proposed by Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter (2007), which allows us to 
test exponential, hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and a more general form. The model 
10 See Richard Thaler (1981), Uri Benzion, Amnon Rapoport, and Joseph Yagil  (1989), Loewenstein and Prelec 
(1992), and Pender (1996).
11 See Laibson (1997), Laibson et al. (1998), O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin (1999), and George-Marios Angeletos 
et al. (2001).
12 This formulation has been used to study retirement planning, gym membership, procrastination, deadlines, and 
addiction (B. Douglas Bernheim, Jonathan Skinner, and Stephen Weinberg 2001; Stefano DellaVigna and Ulrike 
Malmendier 2006; Peter Diamond and Botond K ˝     oszegi 2003; Laibson, Andrea Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman 1998; 
O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999, 2001).
Table 5—IV-2SLS Regressions for Risk Aversion (σ)
first stage
Dependent variable
Income Relative income Mean income
Rainfall 0.018 (0.006)*** −0.000 (0.000) 0.019 (0.002)***
Head of household can’t work (dummy) −11.846 (7.786) −0.930 (0.380)** −2.869 (2.584)
Chinese 6.741 (6.824) 0.196 (0.333) 10.942 (2.265)***
Age 0.035 (0.128) 0.003 (0.006) 0.054 (0.042)
Gender −5.129 (3.282) −0.012 (0.160) −2.063 (1.089) *
Education 0.706 (0.440) 0.036 (0.021) * 0.281 (0.146) *
Distance to market −1.0673 (0.974) 0.021 (0.048) −1.137 (0.323) ***
South 10.483 (3.277) *** −0.040 (0.160) 9.340 (1.088) ***
Constant −13.122 (10.671) −0.179 (0.521) −14.209 (3.541) ***
Observations 181 181 181
R2 0.15 0.05 0.58
f-statistic 3.89 1.17 30.22
second stage
Dependent variable
σ (Value function curvature)
Chinese −0.035 (0.143) −0.096 (0.138)
Age −0.006 (0.003)** −0.006 (0.002)***
Gender 0.022 (0.073) −0.006 (0.059)
Education −0.029 (0.010) *** −0.028 (0.010) ***
Income (IV) 0.010 (0.006)
Relative income (IV) 0.049 (0.148)
Mean income (IV) 0.010 (0.005)*
Distance to market −0.012 (0.017) −0.013 (0.010)
South −0.155 (0.094) −0.148 (0.080)*
Constant 0.980 (0.174) *** 0.992 (0.160) ***
Observations 181 181
R2 0.08 0.08
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
  * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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assigns a value to reward y at time of yβ (1 − (1 − θ)rt )1/(1−θ) for t > 0 (or simply y for immediate 
reward at t = 0).13
The three factors r, β, and θ separate conventional time discounting (r), present-bias (β), and 
hyperbolicity (θ) of the discount function. When β = 1, as θ approaches one the discounted 
value reduces to exponential discounting (e−rt ) in the limit. When θ = 2 and β = 1, it reduces 
to true hyperbolic discounting (1/(1 + rt )). When θ = 1 (in the limit) and β is free, it reduces to 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting (βe−rt ). The three-parameter form enables a way to compare three 
familiar models at once.
In our experiments, subjects make 75 choices between smaller rewards delivered today and 
larger rewards delivered at specified times in the future as follows: Option A: receive x dong 
today; or Option B: receive y dong in t days.
The reward x varies between 30,000 to 300,000 and the time delay t varies between three days 
and three months (see Table A2 in the Web Appendix).14
Before conducting the experiment, we chose and announced a trusted agent who would keep 
the money until delayed delivery date to ensure subjects believed the money would be delivered. 
The selected trusted persons were usually village heads or presidents of women’s associations. 
In five villages, the trusted agents were also experimental subjects. Agreement letters of money 
delivery were signed between the trusted agents and the first author. Agents were instructed to 
deliver the money to the houses of experimental subjects, which tries to equalize the pure trans-
action costs of receiving money immediately (i.e., at the end of the experiment) or in the future.15
After subjects completed all 75 questions, we put 75 numbered balls in the bingo cage and 
drew one ball to determine a pairwise choice. The option chosen for that pair (i.e., A or B) deter-
mined how much money was to be delivered, and when.
13 The original Benhabib-Bisin-Schotter model includes the present bias in the form of a fixed cost. Zafer Akin and 
Abdullah Yavas (2007) estimate the model and find the present bias parameter in the form of a fixed cost is not well 
supported by the data.
14 The largest amount of y, 300,000 dong (about 19 dollars), is 15 days’ wages in the rural north.
15 A referee suggested appropriately cautious wording: “There are many risks involved with leaving the money with 
the village head; one is that the village head will give out the money early, another is that the village head will keep the 
money for himself, another is that the village head will encourage those players who will be receiving a lot of money 
in the future to redistribute it within the village as earnings are no longer anonymous. These issues may affect the 
values of r, β, and θ in different ways. Given the difficulties in experimental design we did the best we can, and these 
are interesting issues for future research.” 
Table 6—Comparison of Exponential, Hyperbolic, and Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting Models
Exponential Hyperbolic Quasi-hyperbolic Equation (1)
µ (x10-6) 6.26***(0.319)
7.60***
(0.408)
8.58***
(0.544)
8.70 ***
(0.553)
r 0.021***
(0.001)
0.046***
(0.004)
0.008***
(0.001)
0.078
(0.074)
β 0.644***(0.019)
0.820***
(0.070)
θ 5.070***(0.659)
Observations 5,340 5,340 5,340 5,340
Adjusted R2 0.515 0.519 0.522 0.523
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for within-subject correlations.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
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We denote the probability of choosing immediate reward of x over the delayed reward of y in t 
days by P(x > (y, t )), and use a logistic function to describe this relation as follows:
(1) P(x > (y, t )) =  1  _____________________________    
1 + exp A−μ Ax − yβ (1 − (1 − θ)rt)1/1−θ B B 
We estimate the parameters µ, β, θ, and r in the logistic equation above. The variable μ is a 
response sensitivity or noise parameter.
C. Empirical Results
Estimation results comparing specific functions are given in Table 6. We fitted the logistic 
function (1) by using a nonlinear least-squares regression procedure.16 The estimated values of 
(r, β, θ ) are (0.078, 0.82, 5.07).17 This implies subjects should trade 6,151 dong today for 10,000 
dong in a week, and 4,971 dong today for 10,000 dong in three weeks.
In addition to the general model (1) (shown in the far right column), we estimated exponen-
tial, hyperbolic, and quasi-hyperbolic discounting models. Estimating the full model (1) with 
unrestricted θ does not improve R2 much compared with the estimation of the quasi-hyperbolic 
model, so we focus attention only on the quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
Next, we estimate the following logistic function (2) to see whether demographic variables 
correlate with individual difference in present bias (β) and discount rates (r):
(2)  P(x > (y, t )) =  1  ______________________   
1 + exp (−μ(x − yβ exp [−rt ]))   ,
where β = β0 + Σβi Xi, r = r0 + Σri Xi, and demographic variables and associated coefficients 
are represented by Xi and βi or ri.
Table 7 shows the results from regressing estimates of the quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
model, allowing β and r to depend on demographic variables. We conducted nonlinear estima-
tions of the logistic function (2), using household income as an independent variable for the 
first regression (reported in column (1)), and relative and mean village income as independent 
variables for the second regression (reported in column (2)).18 The variable “trusted agent” is 
a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if the subject is a trusted agent for money delivery. The 
variable “risk payment” corresponds to the amount of money the subject received in the risk 
experiment.
The largest effects are on discount rates r. Household income and mean village income are 
positively related with patience (lower r). None of the income variables explains individual 
difference in present bias (β) while the estimated coefficient of β in Table 6 (0.644) indicates 
subjects are present biased. This implies people are present biased regardless of their wealth, 
and the degree of present bias is comparable to estimates from a variety of other studies.19
16 We excluded data from three subjects who made alternating responses across consecutive rows. 
17 t-tests of θ = 1 (quasi-hyperbolic discounting) and each of the restrictions β = θ = 1 (exponential discounting) 
and β = 1 and θ = 2 (hyperbolic discounting) reject all restrictions at p > 0.0001.
18 The coefficients of explanatory variables for r (discount rates) are multiplied by 100. 
19 See Alexander L. Brown, Camerer, and Zhikang Eric Chua (2009) for a review of quasi-hyperbolic model 
estimates.
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The amount of money made in the risk game earlier in the experimental session is weakly 
correlated with patience: individuals who received higher payments in the risk game exhibit 
lower discount rates r. The choices made by the individuals who were assigned the role of money 
delivery were not significantly different from those of other subjects.20 We also conducted 
regressions using instrumental variables (IV) for income variables, because the results of the 
Davidson-MacKinnon test suggest OLS is an inconsistent estimator. Table 8 shows the regres-
sion results from the IV estimations. It indicates household income, as well as a mean village 
income correlate with lower discount rates.
20 We also conducted regressions without the data of the five subjects who were assigned the role of money delivery. 
There were few changes in regression results (see Web Appendix Table A3). 
Table 7—Correlations with Present Bias and Discount Rates (OLS)
 β (Present bias) r (Discount rate)
(1) (2) (1) (2)
µ (x10−6 ) 8.93*** 9.14***
(0.59) (0.61)
Constant (β0, r0) 0.673*** 0.676*** 0.021*** 0.023***(0.096) (0.098) (0.004) (0.004)
Chinese −0.037 −0.046 −0.199 −0.019
(0.086) (0.089) (0.337) (0.316)
Trusted agent −0.043 −0.032 −0.189 0.085
(0.080) (0.080) (0.265) (0.293)
Age 0.001 0.001 −0.013** −0.012**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Gender 0.013 0.015 −0.122 −0.121
(0.039) (0.039) (0.141) (0.130)
Education −0.009 −0.009 −0.037** −0.023
(0.005) (0.006) (0.017) (0.015)
Income 0.510 −4.530**
(0.658) (1.782)
Relative income 0.000 0.016
(0.019) (0.065)
Mean village income 1.196 −29.838***
(2.381) (7.512)
Distance to market 0.013 0.013 −0.010 0.000
(0.012) (0.012) (0.037) (0.034)
South −0.053 −0.059 −0.153 0.080
(0.046) (0.050) (0.152) (0.163)
Risk payment −0.819 −0.928 −7.144** −4.115
(1.011) (1.015) (3.593) (3.602)
Observations 5,340 5,340
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.52
Davidson and MacKinnon test f-statistic
= 4.58
( p = 0.011)
f-statistic
= 3.18
( p = 0.014)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for within-subject correlations. The estimated 
coefficients of explanatory variables for r (discount rates) are multiplied by 100. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
VOL. 100 NO. 1 569TANAkA ET AL.: RIsk ANd TIME PREfERENcEs
IV.  Conclusion
We conducted experiments in Vietnamese villages to investigate how income and other demo-
graphic variables are correlated with risk and time preference.
Our results suggest mean village income is related to risk and time preferences. People liv-
ing in poor villages are not necessarily afraid of uncertainty, in the sense of income variation; 
instead, they are averse to loss. When we introduce instrumental variables for income vari-
ables, mean village income is also significantly correlated with risk aversion (concavity of the 
utility function). From the time discounting experiment, we found that mean village income is 
correlated with lower discount rates, that is, people living in wealthy villages are not only less 
risk averse but also more patient.
Household income is correlated with patience (lower interest rate) but not with risk preference, 
which is consistent with the classic result of Binswanger (1980, 1981). Our results also demon-
strate that people are present biased regardless of their income levels and economic environments.
These results are exploratory and the experimental measures are not perfect. Furthermore, in 
a cross-sectional study like this, it is difficult to conclude much about the direction of causality 
between preferences and economic circumstances because the study was not designed to do so. 
Table 8—Correlations with Present Bias and Discount Rates (IV-2SLS)
 β (Present bias) r (discount rate)
(3) (4) (3) (4)
µ (x10−6 ) 9.09*** 9.09***
(0.61) (0.18)
Constant (β0, r0) 0.664*** 0.643*** 0.024*** 0.023***(0.098) (0.113) (0.004) (0.004)
Chinese −0.055 −0.086 −0.023 0.161
(0.078) (0.106) (0.337) (0.358)
Trusted agent −0.039 −0.065 −0.334 −0.147
(0.078) (0.075) (0.223) (0.239)
Age 0.000 0.000 −0.015** −0.013**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006)
Gender 0.037 0.032 −0.162 −0.051
(0.045) (0.040) (0.140) (0.140)
Education −0.012 −0.010 −0.002 −0.019
(0.007) (0.008) (0.020) (0.022)
Income (IV) 3.801 −38.985***
(4.497) (13.313)
Relative income (IV) −0.044 −0.128
(0.144) (0.437)
Mean village income (IV) 5.994 −36.264**
(4.878) (14.907)
Distance to market 0.012 0.010 0.034  0.034
(0.012) (0.012) (0.039) (0.040)
South −0.081 −0.091 0.239 0.176
(0.060) (0.055) (0.213) (0.212)
Risk payment −1.078 −1.605 −5.404 −5.022
(1.104) (1.417) (3.993) (4.4507)
Observations 5,340 5,340
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.52
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. We adjusted standard errors for correlations within individuals. The esti-
mated coefficients of explanatory variables for r (discount rates) are multiplied by 100.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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We used instrumental variables to deal with the income endogeneity problem. However, prefer-
ences and circumstances may be causal in both directions.
Finally, one contribution of our study is to show how to expand measurements of risk and 
time preferences beyond one-parameter expected utility and exponential discounting, replacing 
those models with prospect theory and the Benhabib et al. three-parameter discounting model. 
The parameters we measure are comparable to those in other studies (particularly the first direct 
replication using our risk preference measurement method, by Liu (2008) studying Chinese 
farmers) and correlate in interesting ways with household measures.
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